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This thesis focuses on securing critical infrastructures such as chemical plants,
manufacturing units, and power generating plants against attacks that disrupt the information
flow from one component to another. Such systems are controlled by an Industrial Control
System (ICS) that includes controllers communicating with each other, and with physical
sensors and actuators, using a communications network.
Traditional security models partition the security universe into two worlds, secure
and insecure, but in the real world the partitions often overlap and information is leaked
even through the physical observation which makes it much harder to analyze a Cyber
physical system (CPS). To overcome these, this thesis focus on the Multiple Security Domain
Nondeducibility (MSDND) model to identify the vulnerable points of attack on the system
that hide critical information as in the STUXNET virus rather than theft of information. It is
shown howMSDND analysis, conducted on a realistic multi-stage water treatment testbed, is
useful in enhancing the security of a water treatment plant. Based on the MSDND analysis,
this thesis offers a thorough documentation on the vulnerable points of attack, invariants
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AIT Analyzer Indicating Transmitter
BIT Belief, Information transfer and Trust
CPS Cyber Physical Systems
DPIT Differential Pressure Indication Transmitter
ICS Industrial Control System
LIT101 Level Indicating Transmitter in Process 1
LS Level Switch
MV101 Motorized Valve 101 in Process 1
P1 Process 1
P101 Pump 101 in Process 1
PIT Pressure Indicating Transmitter
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
T101 Tank 101 in Process 1
Greek
⊕ XOR
xφ A Question that should be evaluated
Subscripts
P1_SDi Security Domain i in Process 1
sx State x
SDi Security Domain
V ix(w) Valuation Function to know the status of x from SDi, this assigns a
truth value
1. INTRODUCTION
Cyber Physical Systems [Dunaka and McMillin, 2017], such as water treatment
and power systems, are the pillars of sustainability for any working community. These
systems are a combination of a control system and instrumentation used for process control.
In general these systems are implemented by Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) or distributed control system (DCS) and programmable logic controllers (PLC).
These systems are used in chemical plants, manufacturing units, power generation, oil and
gas systems. These systems are also called Industrial Control Systems.
An ICS [Stouffer et al., 2011] consists of physical, control, and network devices
(Figure 1.1). In general, control devices are PLCs. The PLCs in an ICS can be viewed
collectively as a distributed control system that transforms the state of the process through
the use of sensors and actuators. The state of the physical process is collected by sensors and
sends to controllers through a communication channel. A controller calculates the control
command based on the control logic in controller and sends it to actuators, which eventually
change the physical process. There could be more than one stage in a single ICS plant and
each stage controlled by its own PLC. It is a distributed control system. Different controllers
communicate through a network in order to know the state of the other parts of the system.
SCADA, HMI, engineering workstations, and a historian are connected to the network for
monitoring purposes.
A successful cyber attack [ics, 2016] on such plants could de-stabilize an entire
community. Recent increase in successful cyber physical attacks on public infrastructure
[Cobb, 2016, LIPOVSKY, 2016, Weinberger, 2011], and other mostly unsuccessful attempts
[ics, 2016], have raised the importance of security analysis of an industrial CPS. There exists
a variety of commercial products available for cyber attack prevention and detection that
include firewalls and intrusion detection systems. However, attackers are often bypassing
2Figure 1.1. High level view of a Cyber Physical System (CPS).
these defense mechanisms by exploiting software and hardware vulnerabilities or through
social engineering. It therefore becomes important to look for ways of detecting process
anomalies in an ICS caused by an attacker who has gained unauthorized entry.
A recent survey on industrial SCADA systems shows that attackers are trying to
attack 20% of SCADA computers [Adepu and Mathur, 2016b, securelist.com, 2017]. The
threat landscape is shown in Figure 1.2 [securelist.com, 2017]. Hence, it is critical to analyze
the vulnerability of such plants and recommend actions to improve the plant design. This
work proposes, and evaluates, an approach for such analysis. The entire work reported here
was conducted on a water treatment testbed which serves as a miniature version of a real
water treatment plant to perform experiments and improve security.
A typical water treatment plant consists of multiple stages. Each stage in the treatment
process either removes impurities from the incoming water or adds chemicals to prepare for
the next stage. This study was conducted on a water treatment plant testbed consisting of
six stages for water purification. Each stage has several sensors, actuators and PLCs that
communicate with each other, and with other PLCs, in different stages to make the system
work efficiently and effectively. Overall, there are 42 sensors and actuators distributed across
different stages of the plant.
3Figure 1.2. Percentages of ICS systems attacked.
In any CPS there is information flow across its components for the controllers to
coordinate and perform the intended tasks. This flow of information can be disrupted
by sending false values to other components. Here, “false value” refers not only to the
manipulation or stealing of information but simply hiding of critical information. Such
attacks on the information flow cannot be identified unless there is an independent way to
derive the true state of the component. This work examines the general security attributes
related to each component of the system, each with their own security domain, using Multiple
Security Domain Nondeducibility (MSDND) [Howser and McMillin, 2014] models and
Belief, Information transfer and Trust (BIT)[Liau, 2003][Liau, 2005] logic.
42. SYSTEMMODEL
The system consists of six stages (Figure 2.1), also referred to as processes [Mathur
and Tippenhauer, 2016]. There is an operational PLC and a backup PLC at each stage that
controls the flow of water and water purification. The primary function of Process 1 is to
keep the water always available in the tank for use in subsequent processes. This is done with
the help of a motorized valve which opens to let the water in and a pump to send water to the
next process. Water from Process 1 is fed through a chemical dosing system at Process 2
which doses chemicals for maintaining the pH and oxidation reduction potential (ORP:
a measurement that indicates the degree to which a substance is capable of oxidizing or
reducing another substance) and conductivity of water. Process 3 contains an Ultrafltration
(UF) unit. Here water is sent through the UF membranes to remove micrometer sized
impurities. The output of UF is passed through Process 4, an ultraviolet chlorine destruction
Unit which removes free chlorine from the water; this removal is necessary before Process 5
(reverse osmosis process) as the free chlorine present in the water could damage the RO
membranes. In addition to removing free chlorine, Sodium bisulphate (NaHSO3) is added
to the water, when necessary, to control the ORP. Lastly, the water from the RO unit has
two paths to go to Process 6. Pure water is sent to the RO permeate treatment system and
impure water, also known as reject, is sent to the UF backwash system. The water from the
UF backwash system is used for cleaning the UF membranes every 30 minutes or when the
differential pressure across the UF membrane is greater than a preset. In the RO-CIP system,
the water is a mixture of water from RO permeate and NaOCl from Process 2.
A cyber physical attacker model [Adepu and Mathur, 2016a] for industrial control
systems such as this, consists of intentions. Attacker intentions include component damage,
changing properties of the system, and performance degradation. Several attacks have been
5Figure 2.1. Architecture of the testbed.
launched on different sensor measurements and actuator measurements. Some specific
scenarios were designed and attacks were launched on a real-time operational water treatment
[Mathur and Tippenhauer, 2016] plant called Secure Water Treatment Testbed.
It is assumed that the attacker has the capability to enter into the system using
vulnerabilities in the system and through social engineering. The attacker is capable of
performing attacks such as STUXNET [Weinberger, 2011] and Ukraine power blackout
[LIPOVSKY, 2016]. This work does not focus on how the attacker is entering into the
system. An attacker has access to communication channels in the plant network. In general
attacker has ability to modify the network packets in the communication channels.
PLCs use sensors such as flow indication transmitters (FIT) and level indication
transmitters (LIT). These sensors are located across all the processes to monitor the water
flow. Actuators such as motorized valves (MV) and pumps (P), are used to control the
flow of water across processes. These sensors, actuators and PLCs are the most vulnerable
points for cyber, as well as physical, attacks which hide critical information flowing between
6either a sensor and PLC, or between a PLC and an actuator. It is easy for one component to
believe in the truth value of information coming from the other. For example, an intruder
can attack a component such as sensor or actuator and always send incorrect values to the
PLC regardless of the actual values. To avoid such an attack, the MSDND model is used to
reveal where the vulnerabilities lie.
73. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This work models Stuxnet-like [Chen, 2010] attacks on the water treatment system
using MSDND to locate points of vulnerability. The focus of such attacks is to hide critical
information rather than steal it. Once into the system; viruses that aim at hiding information
stay dormant and learn the behavior of the system before corrupting the information. There
are two basic ways to hide this information: make it impossible to evaluate the desired
question, say φ, or to disrupt the actual valuation function to return an unreliable valuation
of the question φ. It is bad for the system if it is MSDND secure with respect to integrity
since by the definition of MSDND the observer does not have valuation functions for the
states of the system, i.e. one cannot determine the truth value of a system state. However, it
is good for the system with respect to confidentiality because an observer will not be able to
know changes made to the system. Thus, given a system the problem is to identify all such
“good" and “bad" paths. This paper proposes the use of MSDND as an approach to solve this
problem and make design recommendations.
Figure 3.1. Process 1 with Security Domains.
83.1. ATTACKS
Process 1 (P1) as shown in Figure 3.1 consists of MV101 (motorized valve), raw
water tank and P101 (pump) which serve the purpose of pumping the water to the next stages
of the water system. PLC 1 makes sure that there is enough water in the tank at any time to
be pumped to next stage by looking at the level indication transmitter (LIT) sensor which is
mounted over raw water tank T101. When it senses the water level is L (low) or L (very
low) it opens valve MV101 to let water into the tank. Similarly, if the water level is H (high)
or HH (very high), PLC1 will turn on pump P101 to pump water from the tank thus not
draining or overflowing the tank.
Consider an attack on LIT101 of P1 where the goal of the attacker is to overflow
tank T101. The intruder always injects a lesser value to LIT101 irrespective of its real value
expecting that the PLC 1 will open MV101 to fill the tank and eventually causing an overflow.
To apply the MSDND security model, initially, the set of all components are partitioned into
security domains as shown in Figure 3.1. Next the information flow paths for each security
domain are checked against MSDND for security. Formally, this process is illustrated in
Section 5 using BIT logic.
3.2. ATTACK TOOL
Researchers have developed a tool named SWaTAssault [Urbina et al., 2016] to
aid in launching attacks on the water treatment system. This tool enables the launch of
various types of attacks such as MITM, command injection, and stealthy replay attacks on
Level 0 and Level 1 networks. The launch is carried out by programmatically overriding and
manipulating packets between PLCs, sensors, and actuators. Figure 3.2 shows the dashboard
screen shot of the implemented invariants with their violation status when an attack happens.
9Level 0 is the communication channel between Remote Input Output (RIO) and PLC. RIO
receives the sensors signals from the physical process. Level 1 is the communication channel
among different PLCs and engineering workstation.
3.3. PROVERIF
ProVerif is a tool for automatically analyzing the security of cryptographic protocols.
Support is provided for, but not limited to, cryptographic primitives including: symmetric
and asymmetric encryption; digital signatures; hash functions; bit-commitment; and non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs. ProVerif is capable of proving reachability properties,
correspondence assertions, and observational equivalence. These capabilities are particularly
useful to the computer security domain since they permit the analysis of secrecy and
authentication properties. Moreover, emerging properties such as privacy, traceability, and
verifiability can also be considered. Protocol analysis is considered with respect to an
unbounded number of sessions and an unbounded message space. The tool is also capable
of attack reconstruction: when a property cannot be proved, ProVerif tries to reconstruct an
execution trace that falsies the desired property.
The primary goal of ProVerif is the verification of cryptographic protocols. Cryp-
tographic protocols are concurrent programs which interact using public communication
channels such as the Internet to achieve some security-related objective. These channels are
assumed to be controlled by a very powerful environment which captures an attacker with
"Dolev-Yao" capabilities. Since the attacker has complete control of the communication
channels, the attacker may: read, modify, delete, and inject messages. The attacker is also
able to manipulate data, for example: compute the ith element of a tuple; and decrypt
messages if it has the necessary keys. The environment also captures the behavior of
dishonest participants; it follows that only honest participants need to be modeled. ProVerif’s
10
Figure 3.2. Implemented Invariants of Process 1 with Violation Status.
input language allows such cryptographic protocols and associated security objectives to
be encoded in a formal manner, allowing ProVerif to automatically verify claimed security
properties.
In this thesis, Bruno Blanchet’s ProVerif [Blanchet, 2008] automates the MSDND
process for water treatment testbed using observational equivalence and integrity properties,
in addition to that it verifies the correctness of the system with the help of proofs. The
ProVerif proofs are presented in Section 5
11
4. RELATEDWORK
This paper focuses primarily on information flow disruption rather than theft of
information. Research related to this aspect of cyber security is summarized below.
Challenges in addressing safety and security against cyber attacks are addressed
in [Cardenas et al., 2008]. Lee [Lee, 2008] presented cyber physical systems from an
embedded systems point of view and described the problems in computing and networking
for the design of CPS. Humayed et al. [Humayed et al., 2017] surveyed literature on cyber
physical systems security, and presented an orthogonal framework that consists of security,
components, and system perspectives. They focused mainly on four CPS systems such
as ICS, smart grids, medical devices, and smart cars. This paper presents threats, known
attacks, vulnerabilities and security aspects to those vulnerabilities.
"Researchers model cyber attacks on cyber physical systems in different ways:
[Cárdenas et al., 2011] modeled deception attacks that include surge, bias and geometry. In
[Kwon et al., 2013], attacks have been modeled as noise in sensor data. The work described
in [Gao et al., 2010], focuses on the impact of cyber attacks on water treatment behavior
and procedures to launch the attack. This paper also includes a neural network based system
to detect anomaly detection due to exploits on modbus. The remainder of the related work
is closely related to the current manuscript. Investigation of cyber attacks [Adepu and
Mathur, 2016b] on a water treatment system was studied, this works considered impacts
in three different domains: 1) impact on components of water system, 2) impact on water
properties such as pH, ORP and conductivity, and 3) impact on water system performance.
A complementary approach to this current manuscript is based on learning is proposed
by [Krotofil et al., 2015] to determine anomalous behavior within a plant, which considering
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information flow as a key element." This content is contributed by Adepu Sridhar and Dr.
Aditya Mathur, who were the coauthors for DSN conference paper with myself as the main
author.
4.1. NONDEDUCIBILITY(ND) [Sutherland, 1986]
Nondeducibility was introduced by Sutherland in an attempt to model information
flow in a partitioned model. The partitions are divided into two sets, these sets are usually
labeled as high and low with information restricted to one side of the partition or the
other. Information that cannot be deduced from the other side of the partition is said to
be nondeducibility secure. However, the partitions must be absolute and the partition is
necessarily simplistic. Overlapping security domains present difficulties for ND as do
information flows which cannot be evaluated because the model lacks the required valuation
functions. However the restrictions of Sutherland’s ND model made it difficult to model
critical infrastructures like ICS, transportation systems etc. The motivation to model security
for these critical infrastructures and to have much more refined control over the information
being transferred and to deal with multiple physical and cyber components at a time led to
the development of the Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility model.
4.2. MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN NONDEDUCIBILITY
[Howser and McMillin, 2013b] Critical infrastructures have complex interaction
between the physical and cyber components, when such a system is divided into security
domains, the domains often overlap or a security domain is entirely contained in another
which makes it harder for a traditional security model to capture the information flow among
different components that might lead to a vulnerability. To overcome these limitations
present in the traditional models, MSDND security model is used. MSDND is not a high/low
hierarchy model, but is instead a partitioning model. MSDND does not depend upon
13
examining two domains on any relationship between those domains such as low and high or
left and right. The domains in question might be wholly contained in the other, they might
overlap, or they might be disjoint.
There exists some world with a pair of states sx ∧ sy where one must be true and
the other false (exclusive OR), but an entity i has no valuation function for those states. In
security domain SDi, i simply cannot know which state is true and which is false.
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W ` [ ( sx ∨ sy) ] ∧ ∼( sx ∧ sy) ∧ [ w |= ( V ix( w) ∧ 
V iy( w) ) ]
An equivalent formula is
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈W ` [ ( sx ⊕ sy) ] ∧ [ w |= ( V ix( w) ∧  V iy( w) ) ]
If a security domain is MSDND secure then it is bad, as an observer cannot evaluate the
status of that security domain. Similarly, if a security domain is Not MSDND secure then it
is good for the system. These statements hold when we check the integrity of the system.
4.3. VALUATION FUNCTION
V yx (φ) represents valuation function of boolean x in domain y. A valuation function
is a function which assigns a truth value to question φ in state x with respect to the security
domain y.
4.4. SECURITY DOMAIN (SDI) [Howser and McMillin, 2013a]
The event system divides the system into multiple security domains SDi as viewed by
each entity i in the model. These security domains may or may not overlap with each other.
An entity i is any part of the system that is capable of independent observation or action.
Security domains of Process 1 in the water system are shown in Figure 3.1 with rectangular
boxes with dotted lines. Each security domain overlaps with security domain of another
component at the PLC, as PLC controls the information flow among all the components.
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4.5. BIT LOGIC
BIT logic was introduced by Liau [Liau, 2003][Liau, 2005] to formally reason
about belief, information transfer and trust when dealing with cyber entities. While it was
developed primarily for handling trust in database and distributed systems, BIT logic is
useful for describing CPS, especially when humans are involved. Before BIT logic, social
engineering attacks could only be described by a narrative in imprecise language. With BIT
logic, spoofing and other unwanted behavior is described with simple, formal proofs. BIT
logic is designed to reason about the belief and trust an entity i has in information from an
entity j, e.g. the belief and trust an operator has in the reading from a monitoring station.
• Ti, j φ, defines the trust i has in a report from j that φ is true.
– In the proofs presented in Section 5 we use a similar notation, for example,
T6,2LIT101; to indicate that the security domain 6 trusts the LIT101 value sent
by the security domain 2.
• Bi φ, defines the belief by i that φ is true; it does not matter if φ is true or not, i believes
it to be true.
– Example, B6I6,2LIT101; indicates that the security domain 6 believes LIT101
value that it received from security domain 2 is true.
• Ii, j φ, defines the transfer of information directly from one agent to another, that is j
reported to i that φ is true.
– Example, I6,2LIT101; This simply means that information regarding LIT101 is
sent to security domain 6 from security domain 2.
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BIT logic is used in the further sections to clearly specify the information transfer
between components, demonstrate how an intruder sitting in between the components get
access to the information and finally show how the PLC is made to believe manipulated
information.
4.6. INVARIANTS
An invariant is a property that remains unchanged when a specified transformation
is applied. An invariant is experssed as a logical predicate on a system state. Invariant coded
thus must not change its truth value during plant operation. An axiomatic basis for the truth
of invariants on cyber physical systems was first proposed in [Owicki and Gries, 1976]. The
invariants that are considered in this paper are derived by considering the physical properties
of a process and from [Mathur and Tippenhauer, 2016].
4.7. EXECUTION MONITORS
Some research is being done in implementing execution monitors such as the Shadow
Security Unit (SSU [Cruz et al., 2015]) in ICS. The SSU is attached in parallel to Remote
terminal units (RTUs) or PLCs, being able to capture and decode the SCADA protocol
information flow, correlating this information with the status of the physical I/O modules that
interface with sensors and actuators on the field. This enables the possibility of implementing
a redundant security-checking mechanism that follows a black box approach regarding the
analysis of the monitored device behavior. Coupling MSDND and a few techniques from
SSU along with the ground truths encapsulated as invariant equations can further reduce
the bounds on parameters measured in a water treatment plant and also more accurately
determine a corrupted information path. A ground truth refers to information provided
by direct observation as opposed to information provided by inference. If the invariant is
violated, the monitor raises an exception such as that shown in Figure 3.2.
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5. WORKING OF MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN NONDEDUCIBILITY
MSDND analysis can be done to various cyber-physical systems to identify if there
is a vulnerability or not. Here, we use BIT (Belief, Information and Trust) logic to formally
show the exchange of information between components and world states, when these put
together in MSDND equation reveal if there exist a vulnerability. BIT logic is especially
helpful in writing these proofs as this conveys the message without any ambiguity.
Below, two scenarios with respect to an attack on LIT101 (Figure 3.1) are presented
which will help the reader understand the MSDND proofs using BIT Logic.
5.1. THE LEVEL OF THE WATER IN TANK LIT101 IN SECURITY DOMAIN
P1_SD2 ISMSDND SECUREWITHOUT INVARIANTS UNDERANATTACK
The level of the water in tank is normal implies LIT101 = true. During the attack
phase, a virus in P1_SD6 receives sensor reports and always reports to the PLC in P1_SD4
an LIT value lesser than the actual value. Thus the virus has corrupted the information path
between the sensor and the PLC.
1. LIT101 = true; level of the tank is normal
2. w |= VP1_SD6LIT101 (w) = true; the reading is normal and the valuation function in world w is
true
3. I6,2 LIT101; Sensor reports to virus
4. B6I6,2 LIT101; Virus believes sensor report
5. T6,2 LIT101; Virus trusts the sensors
6. B6I6,2 LIT101 ∧ T6,2 LIT101→ B6 LIT101; Virus believes the reading
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7. I4,6 ∼LIT101; Virus always sends incorrect readings
8. B4I4,6 ∼LIT101; PLC believes incorrect readings
9. T4,6 ∼LIT101; PLC trusts reports
10. B2I4,6 ∼ LIT101 ∧ T5,6 ∼LIT101→ B5 ∼LIT101; PLC believes readings are correct
11. w |= VP1_SD4∼LIT101(w) = true; VP1_SD4∼LIT101(w) always returns true
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W ` [ ( SLIT101 ⊕ S∼LIT101 ] ∧ [ w |= ( VP1_SD4∼LIT101( w) ∧ 
VP1_SD4LIT101 ( w) ) ]
Since B4I4,6LIT101 ∧ T4,6LIT101 → B4LIT101, the PLC believes the lie told in
step 7 in all cases. Therefore, unknown to entities in P1_SD4, VP1_SD4LIT101 (w) and V
P1_SD4
∼LIT101(w)
cannot be evaluated. Therefore LIT101 is MSDND secure from P1_SD4.
5.2. IN THE PRESENCE OF AN INVARIANT ON WATER FLOW, WE GET AN-
OTHER INFORMATION PATH TO KNOW THE STATUS OF SECURITY
DOMAIN. AN INVARIANT USEDHEREWILL VERIFY ITSELFWITH THE
STATUS OF OTHER COMPONENTS
The level of water in the tank can be estimated using flow meters FIT101 and FIT201.
These FITs measure the rate of flow of water into the tank and water leaving the tank. By
subtracting outflow from the inflow and multiplying it with a constant, current estimate of
LIT101 can be obtained. The invariant equation considered here is:
LIT_Est : x(k + 1) − x(k) = α(ui(k) − uo(k)) (5.1)
1. LIT101 = true; level of the tank is normal
2. w |= VP1_SD6LIT101 (w) = true; the reading is normal the valuation function in world w is true
3. I6,2 LIT101; Sensor reports to virus
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4. B6I6,2 LIT101; Virus believes sensor report
5. T6,2 LIT101; Virus trusts the sensors
6. B6I6,2 LIT101 ∧ T6,2 LIT101→ B6 LIT101; Virus believes the reading
7. I4,6 ∼LIT101; Virus always sends incorrect readings
8. B4I4,6 ∼LIT101; PLC believes interface report
9. T4,6 ∼LIT101; PLC trusts reports
10. B2I4,6 ∼ LIT101 ∧ T5,6 ∼LIT101→ B5 ∼LIT101; PLC believes readings are correct
11. w |= VP1_SD4∼LIT101(w) = true; VP1_SD4∼LIT101(w) always returns true
12. ∼LIT101LIT_Est =⇒ ∼LIT101; from assumption and invariant (5.1)
13. I4,LIT_EstLIT101; PLC reads the invariant
14. B4I4,LIT_EstLIT101; PLC believes the invariant
15. T4,LIT_EstLIT101; PLC trusts the invariant
16. B4I4,LIT_EstLIT101 ∧ T4,LIT_EstLIT101 → B4LIT101; PLC believes readings are
correct and normal
17. SLIT_Est ∧ SLIT101 = S∗; System is working normally if and if only this is true
18. w |= VP1_SD4LIT101 (w) = true
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈W ` [ ( S∗ ⊕ S∼LIT101 ) ] ∧ [ w |= (∃ VSD4LIT101( w) ) ]
VP1_SD4LIT101 (w) exists: can be evaluated from the invariant, which contradicts the second
part of MSDND definition.
Therefore the system is not MSDND secure, and a potential threat can be detected.
This is good for the plant and bad for the attacker.
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There are level indication transmitters in several processes of the water system, using
LIT_Est invariant we can break the MSDND security. Invariants are present for the flow
indication transmitter, pumps, and motorized Valves for all the processes. The BIT Logic for
these components is similar hence they are tabulated only once Section 6.
The first line of Table 7.2 contains the result of implementing the LIT101 proof.
Similarly, the remainder of Table 7.2 contains the results of testing the remaining processes
[SUTD, 2016]. Table 7.1 summarizes the vulnerabilities in each of the processes and their
mitigation.
5.3. PROVERIF CODE - WHEN THE INFORMATION PATH BETWEEN LIT101
AND PLC IS CORRUPTED
(* Creating a free channel for message passing between PLC and LIT101 *)
free c:channel.
(* Initializing messages that are needed to be passed*)
free LIT101:bitstring [private].
free Request:bitstring[private].
(* Querying to see if the attacker can get any of the messages*)
query attacker(LIT101).
(* Starting a Process *)
let PLC =
(* Sending Request on public channel c *)
out(c, Request);
(* Receiving the LIT101 value *)
in( c, LIT101_val:bitstring );
0.
(* Process ends with 0 and new Process begin *)
(* Process 1 at T101 *)
20
let T101 =
(* Receiving the Request for sending back LIT101 Value *)
in( c,PLC_Req:bitstring );
if PLC_Req = Request then
(* sending back LIT101 Value *)
out(c, LIT101).
(* This initiates the Verification *)
process ((!PLC) | (!T101))
Result:
– Query not attacker(LIT101[])
Completing...
Starting query not attacker(LIT101[])
goal reachable: attacker(LIT101[])
RESULT not attacker(LIT101[]) is false.
Since the LIT101 value is passed through a public channel c, the attacker can read
and manipulate the value, hence, the final result obtained is not attacker is false that means it
is insecure.
5.4. PROVERIF CODE - WHEN THE INFORMATION PATH BETWEEN LIT101
AND PLC IS CORRUPTED IN THE PRESENCE OF AN INVARIANT













(* Here is the function that returns the value predicted by the invariant *)
fun Inv(FIT101,P101,LIT101):LIT101.




(* The choice keyword checks for the observational equivalence *)
out(mon, choice[lit101_val, Inv(fit101,p101,lit101)]);
0.
(* Process 2 at T101 *)
let T101 =
in( c, PLC_Req:bitstring );
out(ch, lit101);
0.
(* The result of observational equivalence is sent to Monitor *)





process ((!PLC) | (!T101))
Result:
– Observational equivalence
Termination warning: v_103 <> v_104 & & attacker2(v_102,v_103) & & attacker2
(v_102,v_104) -> bad
Selecting 0




Termination warning: v_103 <> v_104 & & attacker2(v_102,v_103) & & attacker2
(v_102,v_104) -> bad
Selecting 0
Termination warning: v_106 <> v_107 & & attacker2(v_106,v_105) & & attacker2
(v_107,v_105) -> bad
Selecting 0
RESULT Observational equivalence is true (bad not derivable).
As we are using Invariant to verify the value of LIT101, the result obtained is true,
that means the attacker cannot distinguish the value of LIT101 with invariant value.
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6. MSDND PROOFS
The proofs in this section are similar to the ones in Section 5. The proofs for
components in other six processes of Secure Water Treatment Testbed ( Figure 6.1-6.4 ) are
Tabulated (Table 6.1-6.10) in this Section. Let us consider the first two entries of Table
6.1, which considers FIT101 (Figure 3.1) to explain the scenario of the attack and how the
invariants used help break the MSDND.
The first column represents the actual value of the sensor or an actuator, here, the
value of sensor FIT101 is 5.88. The second column mentions the change in the sensor value
similar to what an attacker might do, in this case, the value of FIT101 is changed from
5.88 to 2.00. The third column shows an invariant, if an invariant exist. The fourth column
provides the MSDND proofs similar to the one explained in Section 5. The fifth column
justifies if it is MSDND secure or not by checking if there exist a valuation function or not,
here, the value of FIT101 is MSDND secure. The last column mentions the impact on the
water treatment plant caused by the attack.
In the second row, the invariant is included, which helps in finding the value of
FIT101. The invariant included is shown in third column. In this case, the result obtained is
Not MSDND secure, which is good for the system.
24
Figure 6.1. Process 2 with Security Domains.
Figure 6.2. Process 3 with Security Domains.
25
Figure 6.3. Process 4 with Security Domains.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The MSDND-based approach was found useful in modeling attacks on a water
treatment plant where the goal of an attacker is to hide critical information from an operator
rather than to steal it. Using this model, vulnerabilities across each stage of the water
system are found and tabulated in this Section. This table lists the number of components in
each process, invariants developed and vulnerabilities remaining. For each process, design
decision is suggested which helps in making that stage more secure and help in generating
invariants. Though the MSDN-based approach was used in this work in the context of a
specific infrastructure, the approach, in its design, is generic and also applicable to other
infrastructures such as power and oil&gas.
However, there remain several security domains that need to have invariants, or
additional sensors, for knowing the true plant status. Vulnerabilities were discovered in later
processes of the testbed such as in Processes 5 and 6 which requires the development of
additional invariants. It is found that components that are vulnerable across all the stages of
the testbed are sensors and actuators that are related to maintaining chemical balance of the
water, hence, these components demand additional work for developing invariants in the
future.
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Table 7.1. Summary of Invariants, Vulnerabilities, and Components in each Stage of the
Water Treatment System
Process Comp Summary Design Recommendations
Process 1 4 Invariants Developed : 4Vulnerabilities Remaining : 0
Invariants for FIT and LIT
should be modified to better
capture multipoint attacks
Process 2 11 Invariants Developed : 7Vulnerabilities Remaining : 6
Chemical processes should
be further analyzed for get-
ting more reliable invariants.
Chemical dosing pumps and
level indicators should bemod-
ified.
Process 3 9 Invariants Developed : 4Vulnerabilities Remaining : 2
Several attacks can be per-
formed on motorized valves
for damaging pumps and drain-
ing water. Install PIT near UF
Unit to generate invariant for
DPIT
Process 4 7 Invariants Developed : 3Vulnerabilities Remaining : 1
Dechlorination Unit and
NaHSO3 dosing’s effects
chemical properties of water,
using this, better invariants
should be made as it effects
RO Unit
Process 5 16 Invariants Developed : 7Vulnerabilities Remaining : 9
Many MSDND Secure paths
are identified, invariants
should be developed to break
the MSDND
Process 6 7 Invariants Developed : 2Vulnerabilities Remaining : 5
Level switches should be re-
placed with level indicators,
and additional FITs should be
installed for generating invari-
ants
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Table 7.2. Testing Results
PROCESS 1
Comp Expected Result Approach Observed Result Comments
LIT101 VP1_SD4LIT101 (w) = true Normal VP1_SD4∼LIT101(w) = true




VP1_SD4LIT,FIT (w) = true Normal VP1_SD4∼LIT,FIT (w) = true
As the FIT101 is made
equal to FIT201 and
LIT101 value is kept as
constant (500), the level of
the water in the tank in-
creases without violating
any invariants
FIT101 VP1_SD4FIT101 (w) = true Normal VP1_SD4∼FIT101(w) = true
Using P1_INV1 the
change can be found. This
invariant is violated only
if the changed value is
lesser than 0.5 units when
it is supposed to be greater
than 0.5 and vice versa.
MV101 VP1_SD4MV101 (w) = true Normal VP1_SD4∼MV101(w) = true
Using P1_INV2 the
change can be found.
P101 VP1_SD4P101 (w) = true Normal VP1_SD4∼P101 (w) = true
Using P1_INV3 the
change can be found.
PROCESS 2
Comp Expected Result Approach Observed Result Comments
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Table 7.2 Testing Results (cont.)
AIT201 VP2_SD4AIT201 (w) = true Normal VP2_SD4∼AIT201(w) = true
Using P2_INV1 the
change can be found.
This invariant does not
tell anything about the
change in the values of
conductivity, it only tells
that the P201,2 should be
off when AIT503 is High.
This might not be correct
when there is a change in
inlet water.
AIT202 VP2_SD4AIT202 (w) = true VP2_SD4∼AIT202(w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of AIT202
AIT203 VP2_SD4AIT203 (w) = true Normal VP2_SD4∼AIT203(w) = true
Using P2_INV2 the
change can be found.
This invariant does not
tell anything about the
change in the values of
conductivity, it only tells
that the P201,2 should be
off when AIT503 is High.
This might not be correct
when there is a change in
inlet water.
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AIT201−3(w) = true VP2_SD4∼AIT201−3(w) = true
Using P2_INV3 the
change can be found. In
this we changed the value
of three AIT but only one
invariant is raised which
tells us about AIT203 and
hence the invariant does
not capture the change.
MV201 VP2_SD4MV201 (w) = true Normal VP2_SD4∼MV201(w) = true
Using P2_INV4 the




P201−8 (w) = true VP2_SD4∼P201−8(w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of AIT202.
PROCESS 3
ComponentExpected Result Approach Observed Result Comments
LIT301 VP3_SD4LIT301 (w) = true Normal VP3_SD4∼LIT301(w) = true
Using LIT_Est the change
can be found.
P301 VP3_SD4P301 (w) = true Normal VP3_SD4∼P301 (w) = true
Using P3_INV1 the
change can be found.
FIT301 VP3_SD4FIT301 (w) = true Normal VP3_SD4∼FIT301(w) = true
Using P3_INV2 the
change can be found. This
invariant is violated only
if the changed value is
lesser than 0.5 units when
it is supposed to be greater
than 0.5 and vice versa.
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Table 7.2 Testing Results (cont.)
MV301 VP3_SD4MV301 (w) = true Emp VP3_SD4∼MV301(w) = true
Using P3_INV3 the
change can be found.
MV302 VP3_SD4MV302 (w) = true Normal VP3_SD4∼MV302(w) = true
Using P3_INV1 the
change can be found.
MV303 VP3_SD4MV303 (w) = true Emp VP3_SD4∼MV303(w) = true
Using Emp_P3_INV3 the
change can be found. In
the absence of an invariant,
whenMV303 is openwhen
it is supposed to be close
thewater is sent to the drain
without being detected
MV304 VP3_SD4MV304 (w) = true Emp VP3_SD4∼MV304(w) = true
Using Emp_P3_INV3 the
change can be found. In
the absence of an invariant,
whenMV304 is openwhen
it is supposed to be close
thewater is sent to the drain
without being detected
DPIT VP3_SD4DPIT (w) = true VP3_SD4∼DPIT (w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of DPIT
PROCESS 4
LIT401 VP4_SD4LIT401 (w) = true Normal VP4_SD4∼LIT401(w) = true
Using LIT_Est the change
can be found.
P401 VP4_SD4P401 (w) = true Normal VP4_SD4∼P401 (w) = true
Using P4_INV1 the
change can be found.
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Table 7.2 Testing Results (cont.)
FIT401 VP4_SD4FIT401 (w) = true Normal VP4_SD4∼FIT401(w) = true
Using P4_INV2 the
change can be found. This
invariant is violated only
if the changed value is
lesser than 0.5 units when
it is supposed to be greater
than 0.5 and vice versa.
UV-D VP4_SD4UV−D (w) = true VP4_SD4∼UV−D (w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of UV-D
AIT402 VP4_SD4AIT402 (w) = true VP4_SD4∼AIT402(w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of AIT402
P403,4 VP4_SD4P403,4 (w) = true VP4_SD4∼P403,4 (w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of P403,4
PROCESS 5
AIT501 VP5_SD4AIT501 (w) = true VP5_SD4∼AIT501(w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of AIT501
AIT502 VP5_SD4AIT502 (w) = true VP5_SD4∼AIT502(w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of AIT502
AIT503 VP5_SD4AIT503 (w) = true VP5_SD4∼AIT503(w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of AIT503
P501 VP5_SD4P501 (w) = true VP5_SD4∼P501 (w) = true
Using P5_INV2 the




PIT1−3 (w) = true VP5_SD4∼PIT1−3(w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of PIT1-3
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MV501−4(w) = true VP5_SD4∼MV501−4(w) = true
There is no invariant to
know the status of MV501-
4. If the status ofMV501 is
On andMV503 isOff in the
normal operation, if these
are reversed then there is no
way for one to evaluate this.
This is same with MV502
and MV504
P501 VP5_SD4P501 (w) = true VP5_SD4∼P501 (w) = true
Using P5_INV2 the




FIT501−4(w) = true Normal VP5_SD4∼FIT501−4(w) = true






LS601−3(w) = true VP6_SD4∼LS601−3(w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of LS601-3
P601,3 VP6_SD4P601,3 (w) = true VP6_SD4∼P601,3 (w) = f alse
There is no invariant to
know the status of P601,3
P602 VP6_SD4P602 (w) = true Normal VP6_SD4∼P602 (w) = true
Using P6_INV2 the
change can be found.
FIT601 VP6_SD4FIT601 (w) = true VP6_SD4∼FIT601(w) = true
Using P6_INV1 the
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